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THE IMPACT OF PARTNERSHIP LAW ON THE
LEGAL PROFESSION"
Robert W. Hillman'*
NCREASINGLY, private practice is group practice. The law firm
is the principal vehicle through which lawyers associate, pool their
professional and financial capital, and participate in the highly com-
petitive market for legal services. The associational form of choice for
the organization of the group into the firm is the partnership.' Part-
nership law, in turn, defines the relationships among the principal par-
ticipants within the firm. This article explores how the regulation of
those relationships has shaped the legal profession and the practice of
law.
I. THE FIRM AS PROVIDER OF LEGAL SERVICES
Successful firms are more than the sum of their parts and, ideally,
survive turnover in their memberships with minimal disruption. They
invest heavily in building firm reputations in the hope of building a
type of "brand loyalty" and differentiating themselves from the com-
petition. They speak to clients and to lawyers they recruit of their
own, unique firm cultures, again in an attempt to differentiate them-
selves from the competition and foster in their constituencies a sense
of loyalty to the firm.
The ongoing quest for firm identity and product differentiation is
supported by practices in the profession, if not norms of legal ethics.
It is the firm that represents the client, appears on the pleadings, signs
the opinion letters, and bills and collects fees for services rendered. It
is the firm that signs the office lease, arranges the bank financing,
hires and fires employees, and opens or closes the branch office. And
*© 1998 by Robert W. Hillman.
** Professor of Law, University of California, Davis. The author is grateful for
the excellent research assistance of Jonathan Warner.
1. Traditionally, the professional corporation has been the principal alternative
to the partnership form of association. The corporate option was developed largely
for tax advantages (many of which no longer exist), and courts have tended to apply
partnership law in defining the relationships among shareholders in a law corporation.
See, e.g., Fox v. Abrams, 210 Cal. Rptr. 260,265 (Ct. App. 1985) (applying partnership
law standards to a professional corporation). The Fox court observed:
It is well-known that the primary purpose of the laws permitting profession-
als to incorporate was to allow them to take advantage of various tax bene-
fits available to corporate employers and employees. There is no reason to
hold that when lawyers decide to practice together in corporate form rather
than partnership, they are relieved of fiduciary obligations toward each
other with respect to the corporation's business.
Id at 265. On application of partnership law to professional corporations, see Robert
W. Hillman, Hillman on Lawyer Mobility § 6.3 (2d ed. 1998) Ihereinafter Hillman,
Lawyer Mobility].
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it is the firm that is the subject of the rankings that appear with in-
creasing frequency in the popular legal press.2
II. THE FIRM AS PARTNERSHIP
Carried to an extreme, an emphasis on the firm as a provider of
legal services masks the reality that the essence of the law firm is the
people who perform services in the name of the firm. For the sake of
the present discussion, these individuals may be assigned to two
roughly-defined groups. In most firms, the larger of the two groups
will consist of employees of the firm. The population of this group
includes such disparate actors as clerical staff, paralegals, associates,
and perhaps even the ubiquitous "non-equity" partners.' Members of
the employee group exchange their services for a fixed wage and, in
some cases, a relatively small share of firm profits. Their relationships
with the firm are defined by their contracts as well as by agency law
and the myriad of other laws that touch on employment relationships.
Distinct from employees are individuals who have the legal and
economic status of owners-the partners in the firm. Under the clas-
sic, egalitarian model of the partnership, a partner is a co-owner, a
residual claimant against the assets and the income stream who bears
both the risk of firm failure and the rewards of firm prosperity.4 The
firm is managed by the partners and for the benefit of the partners. In
this technical but important sense, the partnership is the firm, and the
firm is the partnership.
The interchangeability of the terms "firm" and "partnership" is sup-
ported by statutory law. For example, one would look in vain in either
the Uniform Partnership Act ("UPA") or the Revised Uniform Part-
nership Act ("RUPA") for any reference to "firm." By their silence
on this point, the statutes relegate firms to the status of "partner-
ships," a category broad enough to include associations of bakers or
real estate investors as well as lawyers. From an associational per-
spective, law firms are just another type of partnership, and the rela-
tionships among members of the partnership are governed primarily
by partnership law.5
2. See, e.g., The Am. Law. 100: America's Highest-Grossing Law Firms in 1997,
Am. Law., July/Aug. 1998, Supp. (ranking by firm name).
3. See infra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
4. Co-ownership is a fundamental characteristic of the partnership form of asso-
ciation. See Unif. Partnership Act § 6(1) (1914), 6 U.L.A. 256 (1995) (defining a part-
nership as "an association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business
for profit.. ."); Rev. Unif. Partnership Act § 101(6) (1996), 6 U.L.A. 27 (Supp. 1998)
(same).
5. As a collection of individuals, the partnership is not a homogenous entity. The
individuals may be joined by common goals, but they are also motivated by self-inter-
ests. Critical partnership decisions are zero sum (or appear to those affected to be
such), with one partner's gain being another partner's loss. This is most apparent in
decisions concerning allocation of income among partners. Rare is the firm that has
not allocated increasingly large shares of income to more "productive" partners at the
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III. PARTNER AS STATUS
Accordingly, substantive principles from different sources of law
govern the two groups that operate within the firm. For the employee
group, the agency model shapes the relationship between the em-
ployee and the firm (i.e., the partnership), establishes the rights and
duties that run from the employee to the firm, delimits the authority
of the employee to act for the firm, and addresses the methods and
consequences of a termination of the relationship. The model gener-
ally operates vertically rather than horizontally. That is to say, agency
law addresses the vertical relationship between the employee and the
firm,6 but it scarcely, if at all, treats any relationship that may exist
among the employees of the firm.7 Indeed, it is difficult to find in
agency law support for the idea that a relationship exists among the
employee participants in a law firm.
Contrast the largely vertical model of agency law with the model of
partnership law that operates on both vertical and horizontal levels.
Like agency law, partnership law speaks to the vertical relationship
that exists between each partner and the partnership as a whole. To a
far greater extent than agency law, however, partnership law also de-
fines the nature of the relationship that exists among members of the
partner group.8 Along this line, an entire chapter of RUPA covers
"Relations of Partners to Each Other and to Partnership."9 RUPA
makes clear that the duties of loyalty and care run from each partner
to the partnership and the other partners, 10 that actions in law or eq-
uity may be maintained by a partner against the partnership or an-
other partner," and that the obligation to provide a partner with
expense of their "less productive" colleagues. The key, of course, is how one defines
productivity, and who does the defining.
6. Agency law also addresses relationships between the principal (firm) and third
parties, as well as between the agent (firm member) and third parties.
7. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Agency § 359 (1957) (stating that "[t]he
liability of a servant or other agent to a fellow servant or other agent employed by the
[same] employer is the same as to third persons").
8. Certainly, there exists some slight tension between the two branches of law on
this point. The Restatement (Second) of Agency defines a partnership using the defi-
nition provided by the Uniform Partnership Act. See Restatement (Second) of
Agency § 14A (1957). Commentary to this provision offers the following observation:
The rules concerning the creation of a partnership and the rights of individ-
ual partners and of creditors upon the dissolution of the partnership are mat-
ters not dependent upon agency principles. However, the rights and
liabilities of partners with respect to each other and to third persons are
largely determined by agency principles.
Id § 14A cmt. a (emphasis added). At least as to the relationship of partners inter se,
however, agency principles are generally subordinated to the more specific principles
of partnership law. See infra note 13.
9. Rev. Unif. Partnership Act [Art.] 4 (1996), 6 U.LA. 60 (Supp. 1998).
10. See id § 404, 6 U.L.A. 65.
11. See id. § 405(b), 6 U.L.A. 68.
1998]
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information extends not just to the partnership but also to each
partner. 12
This is not to suggest that partnership law and agency law are more
contradictory than complementary in the setting of the law firm part-
nership. Much of partnership law is drawn from agency law, which
also serves to fill the gaps where partnership law is silent-as it often
is. 3 Still, partnership law fulfills a broader function than agency law
in defining the relationships among members of the partner group.
In addition, partnership law differs substantively from agency law in
several important respects. As one example of such a substantive dif-
ference, consider varying partnership law and agency law approaches
to the termination of the relationships they govern. With very narrow
exceptions, the agent serves at the will of the principal, who is free to
terminate the relationship with the agent at any time. 14 To state it
directly, it is easy to terminate an agent. In the law firm setting, this
means that the non-partner employees of the firm normally may be
discharged summarily with a minimum of ceremony or consequences.
Terminating a partner, on the other hand, is a difficult, tricky, and
potentially dangerous exercise.' 5 First, a partner may not be "fired"
unless there exists a partnership agreement that specifically creates
the power of expulsion.' 6 Absent such an agreement, removal of a
partner requires the cumbersome procedure of dissolving the partner-
ship, liquidating its assets and winding up its affairs, and forming a
new partnership that does not include the partner targeted for re-
moval. 7 Even if there exists a partnership agreement authorizing ex-
pulsions, the removal of a partner is subject to a good faith standard
12. See id. § 403(c), 6 U.L.A. 63-64.
13. Agency law provides default norms applicable in the absence of more particu-
lar norms set forth in the uniform partnership acts. See Unif. Partnership Act § 4(3)
(1914), 6 U.L.A. 250 (1995) ("The law of agency shall apply under this act."); id. § 4
cmt., 6 U.L.A. 250 ("This act is a partnership act and not an act relating to agency or
any branch thereof."); id. § 5, 6 U.L.A. 254 ("In any case not provided for in this act
the rules of law and equity, including the law merchant, shall govern."); see also Rev.
Unif. Partnership Act § 104(a) (1996), 6 U.L.A. 36 (Supp. 1998) ("Unless displaced by
particular provisions of this [Act], the principles of law and equity supplement this
[Act]."); id. § 104 cmt., 6 U.L.A. 36 (the supplementary principles encompass, in part,
"the law of agency and estoppel").
14. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Agency § 118 (1957) ("Authority termi-
nates if the principal or the agent manifests to the other dissent to its continuance.").
15. On law firm expulsions, see Hillman, Lawyer Mobility, supra note 1, § 5.3;
Allan W. Vestal, "Assume a Rather Large Boat. . .": The Mess We Have Made of
Partnership Law, 54 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 487 (1997); Donald J. Weidner, Cadwalader,
RUPA, and Fiduciary Duty, 54 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 877 (1997).
16. See Unif. Partnership Act §§ 31(1)(d), 38(1) (1914), 6 U.L.A. 771, 880 (1995)
(referencing expulsions that are bona fide under the partnership agreement); Rev.
Unif. Partnership Act § 601(3) (1996), 6 U.L.A. 74 (Supp. 1998) (referencing dissocia-
tion caused by expulsion pursuant to partnership agreement).
17. See generally Hillman, Lawyer Mobility, supra note 1, § 5.4.1 (describing pro-
cedure for dissolution and formation of a new partnership).
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and may not be implemented for a "predatory" purpose.' 8 Removing
a partner, in short, is a far more difficult activity than removing an
employee, a distinction explained by varying principles of agency and
partnership laws.1 9
The differing treatment of terminations of partners and employees
is only partly explained by status. Unlike an employee, a partner is a
co-owner of the firm, a status in law that necessarily complicates the
removal of a partner. Care should be taken, however, not to overstate
the significance of a partner's status as an owner. In many firms, the
structure of the partnership is hierarchical, with junior partners having
so little influence and such a marginal interest in firm assets and prof-
its that they closely resemble employees of the firm.20 Indeed, senior
associates and junior partners may, from a functional perspective, be
indistinguishable.
Also complicating a simple distinction between partner and em-
ployee is the proliferation of classes of partners and the creation of
new types of partnership interests. The most notable example of this
is the "non-equity" or "salaried" partner.21 A partner without an eq-
uity interest is obviously a contradiction in terms. Yet the ambiguity
of such a status has not deterred firms from developing tiered partner-
ships and assigning a growing number of their lawyers to a position
that could best be described as that of a "non-partner partner." The
development of different levels of partner status within a firm is one
example of how the modem law firm has outgrown the law of
partnerships.22
IV. THE PARTNERSHIP AS GROUP: THE FIDUCIARY
NORM AND CLIENT LOYALTIES
Further evidence of a growing gap between the law of partnerships
and the reality of the law firm may be seen in the application of fiduci-
18. See, eg., Lawlis v. Kightlinger & Gray, 562 N.E.2d 435,440-41 (Ind. Ct. App.
1990) (agreeing that expulsion may not be for a "predatory" purpose, but finding no
such purpose in the case before the court). On the predatory purpose standard, see
Hillman, Lawyer Mobility, supra note 1, § 5.3.4.3.
19. The difficulties of removing a partner are in contrast with the ease with which
voluntary withdrawal of a partner may be accomplished. See infra notes 48-55 and
accompanying text.
20. See generally Robert W. Hillman, Private Ordering Within Partnerships, 41 U.
Miami L. Rev. 425 (1987) (describing highly structural partnerships).
21. Other labels commonly used include income partners, non-percentage part-
ners, contract partners, and junior partners. See Alexander Stille, Turning to 2-Tiered
Partnerships, Nat'l LJ., Oct. 22, 1984, at 1.
22. The tiering of law partnerships began in earnest in the 1980s. By 1990, 42 out
of the 77 of the largest firms had adopted two-tier partnership structures. See Peter
Giuliani, Amending Traditional Partnerships: Two-Tiered System Offers Associates Al-
ternative Path, NJ. LJ., May 17, 1990, at 16. A 1994 study showed that nearly half
(124) of the 250 largest U.S. law firms reported having non-equity partners. See Non-
Equity Partners, Partner's Rep., Nov. 1994, at 14, 14-15.
1998]
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ary standards firmly grounded in partnership law. "Undivided loy-
alty"' 3 and the "highest good faith"' 4 are the common expressions of
the standard partners are expected to observe in their relations with
each other. Indeed, Cardozo's celebrated "punctilio of an honor the
most sensitive"' 2 statement was recently affirmed by the Missouri high
court as a standard that "still controls" the duties law partners owe
each other.26
A. Loyalty and the "Revolving Door"
If undivided loyalty is the present standard, however, how can one
begin to explain the frequency with which partners plan and execute
withdrawals from firms, clients in hand, to the great detriment of the
firms they are leaving? For many firms, present partners represent
significant future competitors. The extent of the turnover of partners
in law firms has prompted the New York Court of Appeals to de-
scribe the "revolving door" as "a modem-day law firm fixture."27
That such "grabbing and leaving" activities28 are so well-established in
the profession is evidence of a significant gap between the law of part-
nerships and the law under which law partnerships operate.29
Two reasons may explain, at least in part, the dilution of fiduciary
standards in partnership law. The first lies in the standard itself. As
applied to partnerships, the fiduciary standard is a borrowed and ill-
fitting doctrine. A fiduciary is an individual who is expected to serve
the interests of another individual without compromise." Perhaps the
classic model comes from the law trusts and the relationship between
trustee and beneficiary. In the trust setting, the trustee's loyalty obli-
gations are absolute and normally may be discharged without cost to
the trustee. In contrast, a partner's interest will often conflict with
that of another partner, or the partnership itself, particularly on issues
concerning the division of a firm's income. The inevitability and prey-
23. Graubard Mollen Horowitz Pomeranz & Shapiro v. Moskovitz, 565 N.Y.S.2d
672, 674 (App. Div. 1990), affd sub nom. Graubard Mollen Dannett & Horowitz v.
Moskovitz, 653 N.E.2d 1179 (N.Y. 1995).
24. Page v. Page, 359 P.2d 41, 44 (Cal. 1961).
25. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
26. In re Cupples, 952 S.W.2d 226, 235 (Mo. 1997).
27. Graubard, 653 N.E.2d at 1180.
28. The phrase "grabbing and leaving" is used to describe the movement of part-
ners from firm to firm, clients in hand. On origins of the phrase, see Hillman, Lawyer
Mobility, supra note 1, § 1.1.
29. I have suggested elsewhere that fiduciary standards remain alive largely to
regulate the process of withdrawal from a law firm rather than to enforce loyalty
obligations running among partners. See Robert W. Hillman, Loyalty in the Firm, A
Statement of General Principles on the Duties of Partners Withdrawing from Law
Firms, 55 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. (forthcoming 1998) [hereinafter Hillman, Loyalty in
the Firm].
30. "Fiduciary" is from the Latin word fiduciarius, which is derived from fiducia,
meaning confidence or trust. See 5 Oxford English Dictionary 878 (2d ed. 1989).
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alence of such conflicts in the partnership setting render impossible
rigid application of fiduciary standards.31
A second problem with regulating the relations of law partners
through fiduciary standards may be found in another type of con-
flict-the duty owed by a lawyer to the client, discussed below.
B. Dueling Loyalties and the Multiple Masters Conundrum
The relationship between lawyer and client is fiduciary in charac-
ter,32 which means that a law partner owes fiduciary obligations
grounded in partnership law to other partners and fiduciary obliga-
tions grounded in ethics norms to clients. A lawyer as fiduciary serves
two masters-the lawyer's partners and the lawyer's clients. The dif-
fering interests of the beneficiaries of a partner's loyalty obligation
may diverge significantly and even be in conflict. Conflicting loyalties
under a standard requiring undivided loyalty signals a standard that
cannot survive rigid application.
One long-standing example of such a conflict is seen in the prophy-
lactic measures partners may wish to take to restrain future grabbing
and leaving activities by their colleagues. On the assumption that fi-
duciary duties do not restrain future competition by present fiducia-
31. Starr v. Fordhamn, 648 N.E.2d 1261 (Mass. 1995), offers a recent illustration of
the problem. A partner withdrew from a firm that operated under an agreement
giving the founding partners the authority to determine each partner's share of prof-
its. Not surprisingly, the allocation to the then-departed partner was not generous.
Invoking the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the Massachusetts high
court sustained the lower court's findings of a breach of fiduciary duty. It reasoned:
The test to be applied when one partner alleges that another partner has
violated his duty of strict faith is whether the allegedly violating partner can
demonstrate a legitimate business purpose for his action.... Nevertheless,
the business judgment rule does not apply if the plaintiff can demonstrate
self-dealing on the part of the allegedly wrongdoing partner.... A court has
the power to detennhze whether a partner's share of the profits is fair and
equitable as a matter of law.
Id. at 1266 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
The difficulty with this analysis is that profit allocations are fundamentally exercises
in self-dealing. Income not allocated to one partner is available to other partners,
including the partners who are doing the allocating. Starr invites judicial intervention
in common disputes over income allocation, but it is questionable whether this invita-
tion will be, or should be, widely accepted by courts. For an evaluation of Starr, see
Hillman, Lawyer Mobility, supra note 1, § 4.9.
32. Consider the following statement:
A lawyer is a fiduciary agent, to whom clients entrust matters, property, and
information, which may be of great importance and sensitivity, and whose
work is usually not subject to detailed client supervision because of its com-
plexity. Because those characteristics of the client-lawyer relationship make
clients vulnerable to harm, and because of the importance to the legal sys-
tem of faithful representation, the law stated in this Chapter provides a
number of safeguards for clients beyond those generally provided to
principals.
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, ch. 2, introductory note, at 1
(Proposed Final Draft No.d, 1996).
1998]
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ries, partners sometimes seek a contractual means of limiting
competition by including restrictive covenants in their partnership
agreements. Such arrangements are common in associations of such
professionals as physicians, accountants, and engineers.33 Yet for
more than three decades, ethics norms have stricken covenants
among lawyers that restrain competition as impeding the right (near
absolute) of clients to choose their lawyers. 34 The ban on restrictive
covenants reveals that the ties that bind clients and lawyers (grounded
in ethics norms) are stronger than those that bind partners associated
in law practice (grounded in partnership law).
Given the relative clarity of the ban on restrictive covenants and the
certainty of its application, the extent of litigation over these arrange-
ments at first glance is surprising. The stakes are high, however, as
firms strive to protect what they regard as firm assets in the form of
clients. Challenges facing firms on this score are substantial, for the
desire of firms to employ contractual restraints on competition is evi-
dence that such restraints are indeed needed by the firms. Firms fear
future competition from present partners because they doubt the loy-
alty of firm clients. Their concern indeed is sensible in light of the
tendencies of many clients to view their relationships as extending to
particular lawyers rather than the firms with which the lawyers are
associated.35
33. The "overwhelming weight of modern authority" allows enforcement of re-
strictive agreements "where a restriction is necessary to protect either trade secrets or
the goodwill of the employer's business where the employee had significant customer
contact." Milton Handler & Daniel E. Lazaroff, Restraint of Trade and the Restate-
ment (Second) of Contracts, 57 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 669, 730 (1982) (footnote omitted).
Most jurisdictions enforce noncompetition covenants between professionals such as
physicians, accountants, and engineers. See, e.g., Wolf & Co. v. Waldron, 366 N.E.2d
603 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977) (enforcing a noncompetition agreement between account-
ants); Medtronic, Inc., v. Sun, No. C7-97-1185, 1997 WL 729168 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov.
25, 1997) (enforcing a restrictive covenant against an engineer); Ireland v. Franklin,
950 S.W.2d 155 (Tex. App. 1997) (upholding noncompetition covenant in agreement
between physicians).
34. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op.
1072 (1968) ("[A]ttorneys should not engage in an attempt to barter in clients, nor
should their practice be restricted. The attorney must remain free to practice when
and where he will and to be available to prospective clients who might desire to en-
gage his services."). Both the Model Code of Professional Responsibility and the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct prohibit partners from contracting to restrain
competition upon termination of their relationships. See Model Code of Professional
Responsibility DR 2-108(A) (1981); Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 5.6
(1998). On contractual restraints to competition, see Hillman, Lawyer Mobility, supra
note 1, § 2.3.
35. See Hillman, Loyalty in the Firm, supra note 29 (manuscript at 32, on file with
the Fordham Law Review); cf. Susan Saab Fortney, Are Law Firm Partners Islands
Unto Themselves? An Empirical Study of Law Firm Peer Review and Culture, 10 Geo.
J. Legal Ethics 271, 308 (1996) (citing a survey of Texas lawyers revealing 54% of the
respondents "believe clients hire individual attorneys and not law firms" (footnote
omitted)).
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C. "Institutionalizing" Clients
As an alternative to restrictive covenants that operate to restrict
client choice, a firm may seek to "institutionalize" client relation-
ships. 3 6 The success of such efforts will depend upon the support of
the very partners to whom the clients are presently loyal. Is that sup-
port required by virtue of their status as fiduciaries? Can duties to the
firm be the basis for a "mandatory" sharing of clients with other part-
ners in the firm? Do the wishes of the clients need to be considered in
this regard, and if so, is it not likely many clients would prefer the
status quo over sharing policies that may introduce inefficiencies and
greater costs borne by clients?
These questions have no easy answers, if they have answers at all,
but they do at least illustrate the difficulty of applying a one-dimen-
sional fiduciary analysis grounded in partnership law in a multi-dimen-
sional setting where consumers of legal services exist and have well
defined interests clearly recognized in law. At the least, it can be said
that the weakened fiduciary norms of partnership law enable individ-
ual partners to pursue self-enrichment activities-such as the hoarding
of clients-at the expense of their colleagues.
D. Pricing Past Loyalties: Post-Withdrawal
Income Sharing
Elements of partnership law independent of fiduciary standards
also may operate to enhance the position of the individual partner at
the expense of the partnership. Consider in this regard partnership
law's mandates concerning the sharing of income generated following
the withdrawal of a partner.37 At least for income sharing purposes,
both UPA and RUPA provide for the continuation of the relationship
that exists among partners until the cases pending at the time of the
withdrawal of a partner are brought to a conclusion."8 Income de-
36. A few partnership agreements create duties to institutionalize clients. In
Graubard Mollen Dannett & Horowitz v. Moskovitz, 653 N.E.2d 1179 (N.Y. 1995), the
agreement provided: "The partners recognize that efforts towards institutionalization
of the business of the firm is essential to the firm's continuing prosperity. In particu-
lar, the partners approaching phase-down and retirement will integrate, to the extent
possible, relationships between the firm's clients and the other partners." Id. at 1181.
Concluding that summary judgment on the enforceability of the clause would be inap-
propriate, the New York Court of Appeals observed the "best efforts" obligation did
not compromise the freedom of clients to choose their counsel. fi. at 1184. It added:
"Given Moskovitz's insistence that the client looked only to him, and would never
have remained wvith the firm after his departure, whether the promised 'best efforts'
were in fact used is a disputed issue that must be determined at trial." Id.
37. Partners are free to include in their partnership agreements provisions con-
cerning the allocation of post-withdrawal income, provided the agreements do not
prejudice clients. In the absence of such agreements (a situation assumed for pur-
poses of this discussion), the "default provisions" of statutory law apply.
38. See Unif. Partnership Act § 30 (1914), 6 U.L.A. 756 (1995); Rev. Unif. Part-
nership Act § 802 (1996), 6 U.L.A. 91 (Supp. 1998).
1998]
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rived from this "unfinished business" is shared on the same basis and
in the same ratios that income was shared prior to the withdrawal.39
As discussed below, partners historically have not been entitled to ad-
ditional compensation for their work in completing unfinished
business.40
The operative effect of the income sharing principles is dependent
upon the type of practice involved. If the unfinished business consists
of contingent fee tort cases, a potentially long period of income shar-
ing may follow until the cases are brought to a conclusion. When the
departing lawyer's practice consists of ongoing representation of cli-
ents rather than a portfolio of defined litigation matters, on the other
hand, the business pending at the time of withdrawal may be con-
cluded rather promptly, with new matters from existing clients escap-
ing entirely the income sharing requirements of partnership law. The
partner with a practice consisting of such short-term assignments from
clients for which the partner provides ongoing representation may re-
move the practice from the firm at a far lower cost to the partner than
if the practice consists of longer-term, clearly defined engagements. 41
To illustrate, assume Partner A handles the real estate work for a
Fortune 500 company. Partner B has a tort practice consisting of a
few contingent fee cases in early stages of development. Each partner
leaves the firm. The unfinished business relating to A's practice will
normally consist of those matters presently pending for the client.
This may mean A shares income relating to drafting an office lease or
closing an acquisition for the client, but the burden is not great be-
cause each of the matters is brought to a conclusion in a reasonably
short period of time. A new matter given to A by the client after A's
withdrawal normally will not be unfinished business requiring income
sharing with the former partners. Partner B, in contrast, has taken a
substantial portfolio of unfinished business from the firm that may re-
quire long-term efforts to bring to completion. Because of the differ-
ences in their practices, B's income sharing burdens are far greater
than those borne by A. Other factors being equal, A has the more
portable practice and is the more mobile lawyer.
The income-sharing disincentives associated with taking contingent
fee cases from a firm may be alleviated somewhat by one little noticed
change in RUPA likely to further undermine the collegial model of
the partnership suggested by fiduciary norms. Under traditional prin-
ciples of partnership law, no partner is entitled to special compensa-
39. See Hillman, Lawyer Mobility, supra note 1, §§ 4.6-4.7.
40. See infra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
41. But cf Rothman v. Dolin, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 571, 572 (Ct. App. 1993) (sug-
gesting it is both desirable and possible to treat hourly and contingent fee matters the
same in order to discourage the taking of hourly cases).
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tion for winding up activities.42 Income derived from the completion
of cases pending at the time a partner withdraws from a firm is divided
among the original partners without special compensation given to the
partners who actually complete the cases.
43
The assumption underlying the "no-compensation rule" applied to
winding up activities is that compensation is unnecessary because a
withdrawing partner performing services will share in the income de-
rived from other partners performing their services. In practice, of
course, the contributions of former partners may be substantially dis-
proportionate to the income they receive under the sharing model im-
plicit in the no-compensation rule.44 When fees shared by a departing
partner with the firm are proportionately greater than fees shared by
the firm -with the departing partner, a disincentive may exist to the
taking of cases and the ability of clients to choose their lawyers may
be undermined.45
RUPA, however, removes the disincentive by abandoning UPA's
no-compensation principle in favor of "reasonable compensation" for
winding up activities.46 To return to the illustration above, Partner B
may, under RUPA, claim compensation for the post-withdrawal serv-
ices performed in bringing the contingent fee cases to conclusion.47
By allowing compensation for work on cases taken from a firm,
RUPA may intensify efforts on the part of individual partners to con-
trol cases and resist the sharing of clients with other members of the
firm. The commentary accompanying the RUPA provision is sparse,
42. See Unif. Partnership Act § 18(f) (1914), 6 U.L.A. 526 (1995) (excepting only
the surviving partner who winds up affairs following the death of a partner).
43. See, eg., Flynn v. Cohn, 607 N.E.2d 1236, 1237 (Ill. 1992) (involving dissolu-
tion of two-partner firm, with one partner winding up cases generating S531,233 in
fees and the other partner winding up cases generating only S37,000 in fees).
44. Cf. Mark H. Epstein & Brandon Wisoff, Comment, Winding Up Dissolved
Law Partnerships: The No-Compensation Rule and Client Choice, 73 Cal. L Rev.
1597,1599-1600 (1985) (noting that because of the absence of compensation attorneys
may be unwilling or unable to complete matters on which they had previously
worked).
45. A similar problem arises when partnership agreements provide for unequal
sharing of post-withdrawal fees by requiring a former partner to remit all or a large
part of such fees to the firm without requiring the firm to share fees with the former
partner. See, e.g., Howard v. Babcock, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 687, 693 n.8 (Ct. App. 1992)
(noting that the effect of application of the agreement was that former partner earned
$5.10 per hour for 15,917 billable hours attributable to cases taken from the firm),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 863 P.2d 150 (Cal. 1993). For a discussion of one-sided fee
sharing, see Hillman, Lawyer Mobility, supra note 1, § 2.3.4.4.
46. See Rev. Unif. Partnership Act § 401(h) (1996), 6 U.LA. 61 (Supp. 1998) ("A
partner is not entitled to remuneration for services performed for the partnership,
except for reasonable compensation for services rendered in winding up the business
of the partnership.").
47. RUPA does not offer guidance on how reasonable compensation is to be de-
termined. For a discussion of compensation standards and the relationship of quan-
tum merit to partnership law's income-sharing principles, see Hillman, Lawyer
Mobility, supra note 1, §§ 2.3.1.2-4.
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and it is not clear that the RUPA drafters intended this result (or any
result at all).
V. THE PARTNERSHIP AS GROUP: EASY EXIT AND
FIRM STABILITY
Fiduciary standards that do not operate to subordinate the individ-
ual partner's interest in clients to the interest of the firm in the same
clients are consistent with withdrawal and dissolution provisions of
partnership law that serve to support the grabbing and leaving activi-
ties of law partners.
An ancient precept of partnership law is that a partner may dissolve
the partnership at any time through a mere expression of will to this
effect.48 A withdrawal from a law partnership is an act that dissolves
the partnership. Under UPA, this simple proposition knows few qual-
ifications. RUPA limits free dissolvability somewhat by allowing
fixed-term partnerships to survive, without dissolution, the withdrawal
of a partner. Even RUPA, however, maintains free dissolvability for
at-will partnerships, 49 a status under which virtually all law partner-
ships fall." Moreover, neither UPA nor RUPA allows specific en-
forcement of a contractual commitment to remain in a partnership.5
Firms are free to continue through new partnerships formed (some-
times automatically) following the withdrawal of a partner.52 To out-
ward appearances, the withdrawal of a partner and dissolution of the
partnership may seem to have no impact on the continuity of the firm
and its practice. As between the withdrawing partner and the firm, on
the other hand, the effect of the dissolution of the original partnership
48. See Unif. Partnership Act § 31(1)(b), (2) (1914), 6 U.L.A. 771 (1995).
49. See Rev. Unif. Partnership Act § 801(1) (1996), 6 U.L.A. 87 (Supp. 1998). Un-
like UPA, RUPA allows partners to change this result by including an anti-dissolution
provision in their partnership agreement. For a discussion of this point, see Robert
W. Hillman et al., The Revised Uniform Partnership Act 292 (1998). This book was
co-authored by Allen W. Vestal and Donald J. Weidner.
50. Virtually all law partnerships are at-will rather than fixed term partnerships.
See generally Hillman, Lawyer Mobility, supra note 1, § 4.3.4 (discussing conse-
quences of establishing fixed-term partnerships). This distinction may be particularly
important under RUPA, which generally provides for the continuation of a fixed term
partnership following the withdrawal of a partner. See Rev. Unif. Partnership Act
§ 801(2) (1996), 6 U.L.A. 87 (Supp. 1998).
51. Agency theory may explain why partners are free to withdraw, even if the
departure is in violation of an agreement among the partners. Because of the liability
of partners for the acts of each other, a policy of "easy exit" may be essential for
allowing a partner to terminate an unsatisfactory and potentially dangerous relation-
ship. See generally Robert W. Hillman, Indissohlble Partnerships, 37 U. Fla. L. Rev.
691 (1985) (evaluating the policy of free dissolvability). The policy has not been
reevaluated since the advent of limited liability partnerships, which limit the liability
risks associated with acts of fellow partners. See infra notes 60-72 and accompanying
text.
52. See, e.g., Dawson v. White & Case, 672 N.E.2d 589 (N.Y. 1996) (describing a
technique used to remove a single partner from a large firm was to dissolve the part-
nership and form a new partnership that excluded the targeted partner).
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is to define and limit reciprocal claims to post-withdrawal income by
the firm and its former partner.
Dissolution (i.e., withdrawal) is the point at which the relationship
enters the winding up phase of its existence, with claims to income
subsequently generated limited to matters properly classified as unfin-
ished business, or work in progress, at the time of withdrawal. As is
discussed above,53 the nature of some practices is such that considera-
ble unfinished business may be taken from their firms by withdrawing
partners. In such cases, the income-sharing costs associated with with-
drawal are likely to be substantial and may represent a major qualifi-
cation to the easy exit policy of partnership law. Conversely, when
unfinished business attributable to clients taken is slight or nonexis-
tent, the costs disappear, and the easy exit policy of partnership law is
given full effect.54
Complementing partnership law's easy exit policy are developments
in legal ethics that support departing partners at the expense of their
firms. In particular, the well-established bans on both restrictive cove-
nants and economic disincentives to competition by former partners,
discussed above,5 5 significantly limit the ability of a firm to protect
through contractual means its client base. Indeed, it is often the case
that the only goodwill associated with a firm is the individual goodwill
of one or more of the partners. Given the legal norms under which
law partnerships operate, the ease with which partners may leave their
firms, and the indifference of many clients to firm stability, it should
not be surprising that firm goodwill is a nonexistent or dissipating as-
set in many firms.
VI. THE PARTNERSHIP AS GROUP: THE MONITORING
FUNCTION AND CLIENT WELFARE
A. Monitoring and the Firm
Monitoring is an activity of cohesion that connects the disparate
practices of lawyers associated in a firm and serves to distinguish a law
53. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
54. Of course, other costs may be borne by the former partner. Uability may
continue for extended periods on major contracts of the firm, such as the office lease
or bank financing. In addition, the withdrawal from a firm may not in itself extinguish
liability for malpractice of the firm, even if the malpractice occurs long after the with-
drawal. See, e.g., Palomba v. Barish, 626 F. Supp. 722, 726 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (asserting
that mere fact that attorney was not member of partnership at time of former part-
ner's purported negligence did not preclude assertion of client's claim against attor-
ney); Redman v. Walters, 152 Cal. Rptr. 42, 46 (Ct. App. 1979) (remanding after
determining that fact issue remained as to whether client was estopped to assert that
attorney, who had severed relationship with defendant law firm after client had hired
law firm, remained liable for law firm's alleged negligence).
55. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
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firm from a loose confederation of lawyers.56 The mechanisms of
monitoring may take many forms beyond simply supervising present
work, including elaborate screening activities in hiring and lengthy
"partnership tracks" for associates. s7 The development of a sound
firm infrastructure is encouraged, if not required, by underwriters of
malpractice insurance, who view monitoring within firms they insure
as a means of reducing the frequency of malpractice claimsA8
Theory would suggest the liability provisions of partnership law that
render a partner vicariously responsible for the practice misdeeds of
another partner5 9 should promote the development of monitoring and
control mechanisms within firms to insure that services provided to
clients meet the standards of the profession. If fear of vicarious liabil-
ity explains monitoring, one would expect a reduction in the risk of
liability to result in decreased levels of monitoring. The theory, which
offers much in logic, is about to be tested in practice.
B. Monitoring and Limited Liability: The Impact of LLPs
The recent development of new limited liability vehicles has
prompted much debate concerning the effect of limiting or eliminating
56. Under a confederation-type association, "each lawyer develops individual cli-
ent relationships .... The office exists merely to facilitate each lawyer's practice....
[It] is not, however, central to the work the lawyer performs for clients. There is no
need for substantial collaboration or cooperation among partners." Altman & Weil,
Inc., Compensation Plans for Lawyers and Their Staffs: Salaries, Bonuses, and Profit-
Sharing 7 (1986). Moreover, there is minimal monitoring because "each lawyer is
viewed as a master of his or her craft and is permitted to practice with little supervi-
sion or accountability." Id.; see also Fortney, supra note 35, at 307 (noting that attor-
neys with a confederation preference "are more likely to practice in firms that have
not implemented peer review measures").
57. See George M. Cohen, Legal Malpractice Insurance and Loss Prevention: A
Comparative Analysis of Economic Institutions, 4 Conn. Ins. L.J. 305, 347 (1997). As
a firm grows in size, its members may benefit from improved diversification against
risks, including single-client malpractice claims. Cf id. ("Partnerships engage in all of
the risk reduction methods that market insurers do, including diversification.
Although market insurers may provide more diversification, large law partnerships
are close to, if not greater than, the size of some mutual malpractice insurers."). For
an analysis of the benefits of diversification offered by the law firm structure, see
Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Sharing Among the Human Capitalists: An
Economic Inquiry into the Corporate Law Firm and How Partners Split Profits, 37
Stan. L. Rev. 313 (1985).
58. See Ted Schneyer, A Tale of Four Systems: Reflections on How Law Influences
the "Ethical Infrastructure" of Law Firms, 39 S. Tex. L. Rev. 245, 272-73 (1998) (not-
ing that malpractice insurance firms have become "major players in the development
of sound infrastructure"); see also Fortney, supra note 35, at 292-306 (noting that ob-
stacles to peer review include lawyer autonomy, absence of standards, administrative
costs, resistance to utilization of peer review results, and discovery problems).
59. See, e.g., Unif. Partnership Act §§ 13-14 (1914), 6 U.L.A. 444-55 (1995) (dis-
cussing joint and several liability for wrongful acts or breach of trust); Rev. Unif.
Partnership Act § 306(a) (1996), 6 U.L.A. 54 (Supp. 1998) (discussing joint and sev-
eral liability for all obligations of partnership).
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vicarious liability on the quality of services provided to clients.6° One
of these vehicles-the limited liability partnership ("LLP")-radically
alters the liability provisions of partnership law and has become a
dominant form of association for law firms.61 At least under the
RUPA version of this new associational form, registration as an LLP
creates a full shield against liability, "whether arising in contract, tort,
or otherwise ... ."62
In practice, what appears to be a full shield against liability may be
penetrated with a focused blow. Partners remain liable for their own
misdeeds and, in a substantial number of jurisdictions, the errors and
omissions of those under their direct supervision.63 Moreover, a form
60. There is a growing body of commentary in law reviews about law firm LLPs.
See, e.g., Allison L. Bergman, Covering Your Assets: Missouri's New Limited Liability
Partnership Law, 63 U. Mo. Kan. City L. Rev. 679 (1995); John S. Dzienko%ski, Legal
Malpractice and the Multistate Law Firm: Superision of Mustistate Offices; Firms as
Limited Liability Partnerships; and Predispute Agreements to Arbitrate Client Malprac-
tice Claims, 36 S. Tex. L. Rev. 967 (1995); Susan Saab Fortney, Seeking Shelter in the
Minefield of Unintended Consequences-The Traps of Limited Liability Law Firms,
54 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 717 (1997); Robert W. Hamilton, Registered Limited Liability
Partnerships: Present at the Birth (Nearly), 66 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1065 (1995); Martin C.
McWflliams, Jr., Limited Liability Law Practice, 49 S.C. L. Rev. 359 (1998); Larry E.
Ribstein, Possible Futures for Unincorporated Finns, 64 U. Cin. L Rev. 319 (1996).
Similar attention has been given to LLPs in the popular legal press. See, e.g., Jennifer
J. Johnson, Limited Liability for Lawyers: General Partners Need Not Apply, 51 Bus.
Law. 85 (1995); Ronald E. Mallen, Ethics/Malpractice Issues: The Professional and
Ethical Issues Facing the Attorney-Employee, in The Best Entity for Doing the Deal
993 (PLI Corporate Law and Practice Course Handbook Series No. 937, 1996); Ed-
ward A. Adams, Firms Expected to Make Switch to New Format. Limited Liability
Partnerships Seen Restricting Exposure, N.Y. L.J., July 14, 1994, at 1; Kirsten L. Chris-
tophe, Continuing Protection: Converting to a Limited Liability Structure Raises Key
Insurance Issues, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1995, at 92; Dave Lenckus, Liwyers Should Beware
LLP Pitfalls, Bus. Ins., Nov. 27, 1995, at 29; Darryl Van Duch, Some Firms Hesitate to
Adopt L.L.P.: 'One for All All for One' Trait of Partnerships is Shaken, Nat'l I.J.,
May 5, 1997, at 1.
61. A 1995 survey of Texas law firms shows that the LLP form had been adopted
by a majority of large firms. See Fortney, supra note 35, at 280.
62. Rev. Unif. Partnership Act § 306(c) (1996), 6 U.L.A. 54 (Supp. 1998); see Rob-
ert W. Hillman et al., The Revised Uniform Partnership Act 137-41 (1998). This book
was co-authored by Allen W. Vestal and Donald J. Weidner.
63. Many states have language in their LLP statutes holding partners liable for the
misconduct of those under the partners' "direct supervision and control." See, e.g., 805
Ill. Comp. Stat. 205/15-(c) (West Supp. 1998) (stating that a partner in a registered
limited liability partnership is liable for his own negligence and for "that of any per-
son under his direct supervision and control."); N.Y. Partnership Law § 26(c) (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1998) (stating that a partner in a registered limited liability partnership
"shall be personally and fully liable and accountable for any negligent or wrongful act
or misconduct committed by... any person under his or her direct supervision and
control while rendering professional services ...."). Some states impose supervisory
liability by negative reference. See, e.g., Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6132b-3.0S(a)(2)
(West Supp. 1998) ("A partner in a registered limited liability partnership is not indi-
vidually liable... for debts and obligations of the partnership arising from errors,
omissions, negligence, incompetence, or malfeasance committed... by another part-
ner or representative of the partnership not working under tie supervision or direction
of the first partner .... ") (emphasis added); see generally Carol R. Goforth, Limiting
19981
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of limited vicarious liability survives even in LLPs because assets of
the partnership are available to satisfy claims against individual part-
ners. When these assets are reached, the non-liable partners effec-
tively have nonrecourse liability for even "fully shielded"
obligations.64
That said, it is true that the LLP may operate to reduce the liability
risks of lawyers associated in law practice. To the extent that monitor-
ing exists by virtue of the threat of liability, it is also possible that any
contraction of liability will reduce incentives to have in place exten-
sive monitoring and mentoring systems. Remove the threat of liability
and you remove the need to keep in place expensive supervisory sys-
tems developed because of fear of liability, or so the argument goes. 65
the Liability of General Partners in LLPs: An Analysis of Statutory Alternatives, 75
Or. L. Rev. 1139, 1154 (1996) (noting how certain state LLP statutes "adopt an alter-
native verbal formulation addressing the liability of partners for the misconduct of
others").
On liability for supervision, Professor Schneyer makes a very interesting point on
the relationship between supervisory liability and firm controls. In his view, the exist-
ence of the former will encourage the development of the latter: "[T]o the extent that
internal controls can serve as substitutes for direct supervision, and not merely as com-
plements, principals in limited liability entities might find them even more valuable
than do the partners in traditional law firm partnerships." Schneyer, supra note 58, at
275; see also Susan Saab Fortney, Professional Responsibility and Liability Issues Re-
lated to Limited Liability Law Partnerships, 39 S. Tex. L. Rev. 399, 421 (1998) ("To
avoid [liability that may exist for direct supervision), partners may avoid service as
mentors, managers, and supervisors simply because those roles could subject them to
personal liability for others' acts or omissions."); Larry E. Ribstein, Possible Futures
for Unincorporated Firms, 64 U. Cin. L. Rev. 319, 332 (1996). Professor Ribstein
notes:
As long as all partners are vicariously liable for partnership debts they all
have approximately equal incentives to minimize the firm's exposure to tort
liability. But LLP partners may avoid monitoring that could trigger direct
liability for participating in misconduct because their personal liability for
participating in misconduct would exceed their partner's share of the firm's
liability. Thus, specialists may refuse to learn about cases in which they are
not directly involved, and partners may refuse to serve on committees that
oversee high-risk activities such as issuing opinions.
Id.
64. On the nature of this nonrecourse liability and rights of contribution, see Rob-
ert W. Hillman et al., The Revised Uniform Partnership Act 137-39 (1998). This book
was co-authored by Allen W. Vestal and Donald J. Weidner.
65. See, e.g., Schneyer, supra note 58, at 270 ("IN]o regulatory system does more
to promote the ethical infrastructure of law firms than civil liability."); Allan W. Ves-
tal, Special Ethical and Fiduciary Challenges for Law Firms Under the New and Re-
vised Unincorporated Business Forms, 39 S. Tex. L. Rev. 445, 475 (1998) ("Obviously,
[limited liability] firm members who are not directly involved in a project have less
incentive to supervise than they would in a general, nonlimited liability partnership
setting, because their personal assets... are not at risk."); David B. Wilkins, Making
Context Count: Regulating Lawyers After Kaye, Scholer, 66 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1147, 1213
(1993) ("[The] traditional rule that lawyers are vicariously liable for their partners'
misdeeds encourages lawyers to view the law firm as a single entity. Without this rule,
lawyers will have fewer incentives to devote time and resources to monitoring their
partners' conduct and therefore less opportunity to detect and prevent misconduct.").
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Interestingly, the sudden emergence of limited liability for lawyers
has occurred during a time when other, unrelated forces also are
working to reduce incentives for firms to monitor and train. The "re-
volving door" feature of many law firms,66 client loyalties running to
the lawyer rather than the firm, clear incentives to hoard rather than
to share clients, allocations of income based on individual rather than
group productivity, the proliferation of satellite offices, and relentless
pressures to reduce the costs of providing legal services are among the
factors undermining firm investment in establishing and maintaining
monitoring and mentoring mechanisms. 67 As these trends merge with
the narrowing of civil liability vicariously imposed, it is possible that
firms will commit fewer resources to monitoring and mentoring
activities.
Still, there are reasons to believe that the forces described above
may not operate over time to dramatically change the level of moni-
toring activities within firms. First, insurance carriers continue to have
strong incentives to police the ways the firms provide legal services
and to price insurance based on presence of controls such as monitor-
ing mechanisms. A partnership organized as an LLP remains, as a
partnership, fully responsible for the claims of clients.' LLP status
does not reduce the liability of the partnership itself, which means the
need for insurance underwriters to insist on implementation of moni-
toring mechanisms is largely unaffected by conversion of a firm from a
general partnership into an LLP.69
66. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
67. See Standing Comm. on Lawyers' Prof'l Liability, American Bar Ass'n, Legal
Malpractice Claims in the 1990s 23-25 (1996). The ABA Standing Committee states:
Many insurers noted a change in firm structure and the business of lawyer-
ing. Some firms are downsizing, and many are partnerships in name only.
This means less intra-firm supervision, and greater individual responsibility
for profitability. Some insurers are worried that economic pressures will
cause lawyers to over-economize and cut corners on cases, take on unsuita-
ble clients, and delegate too much responsibility to unsupervised associ-
ates. . . . Several insurers emphasized the ongoing economic pressures
against law firms and the overabundance of lawyers. These trends, if contin-
ued, may generate unnecessary claims due to lack of mentorship and control
within firms and the profession.
It
68. Cf. Rev. Unif. Partnership Act § 305(a) (1996), 6 U.LA. 53 (Supp. 1998) ("A
partnership is liable for loss or injury caused to a person ... as a result of a wrongful
act or omission... of a partner acting in the ordinary course of business of the part-
nership or with authority of the partnership.").
69. See, for example, Jett Hanna, Legal Malpractice Insurance and Limited Liabil-
ity Entities: An Analysis of Malpractice Risk and Underwriting Responses, 39 S. Tex.
L. Rev. 641 (1998), who states:
If the entity being insured by an insurer is itself a limited liability entity,
there is no reason for the insurer to modify its assessment of the risk of suit
based on limited liability status. Individual constituents of the organization
might have reduced risk of loss as a result of limited liability status, but the




On a more fundamental level, it is not clear that fear of vicarious
liability explains fully the existence of monitoring mechanisms put
into place prior to the development of limited liability partnerships.
Or, if firms have monitored largely because of the vicarious liability
concern (as opposed to other factors such as the demands of insurance
carriers and clients), then it would appear that they have overstated
significantly the liability risks. Imposition of vicarious liability for
malpractice claims has been a rare event, and the personal assets of
partners have not been meaningfully at risk for the malpractice of
their colleagues.7" Bank debt of a firm and its office lease represent a
far greater risk to the personal assets of most law partners than vicari-
ous liability for malpractice claims.71
The important qualification to be noted pertains to the efforts of
federal regulators during the late 1980s and early 1990s to reach Texas
firms even remotely connected with the failure of financial institutions
in that state, but even here there was surprisingly little in the way of
forfeiture of personal assets by lawyers not directly involved in repre-
senting the institutions.72 Ironically, the aggressiveness of federal reg-
Id. at 645. Compare this with Mallen, supra note 60, who states:
Arguably, different structures, providing different levels of liability coverage
to partners, should affect how insurers rate the risk. Insurers, however, con-
tinue to set rates and determine insurability according to traditional means.
This is logical since the amount of insurance for the entity usually does not
vary depending on the form of the entity. Moreover, the exposure for non-
intentional conduct remains the same for the individual lawyers who com-
mitted the wrongful conduct.
Id. at 1001.
LLP status may reduce the risk of loss for a carrier if it provides coverage for prior
affiliations of lawyers who change firms. See Hanna, supra note 69, at 645. For a
discussion of prior affiliation coverage issues, see Hillman, Lawyer Mobility, supra
note 1, § 4.11.3.
70. For an interesting case involving the vicarious liability of a former partner for
malpractice that occurred long after the partner had withdrawn from the firm, see
Redman v. Walters, 152 Cal. Rptr. 42 (Ct. App. 1979).
71. The RUPA LLP provisions limit contract, as well as tort, liability. See Rev.
Unif. Partnership Act § 306(c) (1996), 6 U.L.A. 54 (Supp. 1998) ("An obligation of a
partnership incurred while the partnership is a limited liability partnership, whether
arising in contract, tort, or otherwise, is solely the obligation of the partnership.").
One would expect parties who enter into substantial contracts with firms to demand,
where appropriate, personal guarantees from partners, which would negate the effect
of LLP status as to those claimants.
72. See, e.g., Hanna, supra note 69, at 652 ("The ultimate issue there was insur-
ance. While some attorneys with direct liability were held personally responsible and
forfeited personal assets, by and large the government was looking for additional in-
surance, and attorneys did not lose their personal assets because of vicarious liabil-
ity."); see also Amy Stevens, S&L Lawsuits Fail to Answer Questions on Ethical
Standards, Wall St. J., Oct. 29, 1993, at B12. Stevens argues:
Indeed, government lawyers freely concede that a major criterion for deter-
mining which cases to pursue and how much money to accept is the level of a
firm's insurance coverage. "Particularly with attorneys, we have to make
sure there will be some kind of recovery source that would justify bringing
this kind of lawsuit," says RTC lawyer Thomas Hindes. For their part, firms
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ulators had the unintended effect of spurring the development of
limited liability partnerships for the purpose of making more difficult
similar enforcement actions in the future.
C. Why Monitor?
It is possible, and perhaps even likely, that in a world that does not
mandate monitoring by one means or another, firms nevertheless wil
voluntarily implement some monitoring mechanisms.73 There are sev-
eral reasons for this, but perhaps the most important have been well-
stated by a lawyer/executive vith a Texas insurance carrier:
The motivation to supervise is usually born of long-term profit mo-
tive, not fear of liability. Higher quality work product should ulti-
mately result in greater economic return .... Firms which do not
have a sufficient level of supervision through firm systems will ulti-
mately make less money or break up. Even attorneys who loathe
supervision will not long associate themselves with an entity that is
perceived as providing low quality services due to the acts of a few
bad apples.... [L]aw firm behavior is not shaped by limited liabil-
ity status, but rather by the willingness of individual attorneys to
submit to and to perform supervision and review. 74
If the point of profit as reason to monitor is lost on some firms, per-
haps the loss of profit will make the point more clearly. Along this
line, there is evidence that some clients prefer to retain firms that
monitor the work of their lawyers,7- and this fact alone may prompt
implementation of voluntary monitoring mechanisms.
76
have little incentive to litigate when they know settlement payments come
largely from insurers' pockets.
Id-
73. This is so even though independence (i.e., resistance to peer review and over-
sight) is a trait of many of the most successful lawyers.
74. Hanna, supra note 69, at 646. Hanna cites a survey published in 1992 (pre-
LLP revolution) indicating large corporate clients are more likely to hire firms with
systems in place to improve the quality of services. See id. at 646 n.22 (citing Nancy
Blodgett, More and More Law Firms Take the TQM Plunge, Legal Mgmt., MaylJune
1993, at 6, 6).
75. See, e.g., Fortney, supra note 63, at 414-19 (describing the results of the au-
thor's survey).
76. Cf Anthony E. Davis, Limited Liability for Lawyers, Prof. Law., Aug. 1995, at
1, 6. Davis states:
[I]t is perfectly reasonable to suppose that a sophisticated client, given a
choice between two otherwise equivalent and qualified firms .... one of
which is a limited liability entity and one of which has retained the tradi-
tional joint and several liability, will select the firm where the potential for
recovery-if things do not work out as planned-is greater.
Id. (emphasis added). As to less sophisticated clients, confusion is likely to exist over
the consequences of various associational forms and their effect on liability. This con-
cern was concisely stated by one commentator: "It is also foolish to believe that the
majority of clients will understand what the designation at the end of the law firm
name means in practice." Dzienkowski, supra note 60, at 985 n.82.
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It is likely that the more pessimistic predictions concerning the
probable effects of LLPs on client welfare are overstated. There are
reasons firms monitor, mentor, and otherwise adopt quality control
measures other than the fear of liability that may arise if they do not.
It is unlikely that a firm converting to LLP status will dramatically
alter the way it provides legal services to its clients. In fact, the com-
petitive market for legal services may very well encourage the devel-
opment of cost-effective monitoring keyed more to client satisfaction
than fear of liability. Of course, all of this is pure speculation because
it is far too early to evaluate the consequences of the LLP form on law
firms and their clients.
D. Ethics Mandates and Firm Monitoring
Finally, it should be noted that lawyer conduct is regulated through
a variety of legal doctrines and theories. Monitoring and supervising
obligations are not the exclusive province of partnership law. In par-
ticular, protection of clients should be a major concern of those who
articulate and enforce the responsibility standards of the profession.77
Although one would expect norms of legal ethics to address precisely
the duty of firms and their partners to monitor, there exists a surpris-
ing absence of authority in standards of professional responsibility re-
quiring the maintenance of internal controls within firms.78 Recently,
however, New York has amended its ethics rules to impose supervi-
sory duties on firms, 79 and it is conceivable that over time professional
77. Beyond partnership law and ethics norms, other areas of law may provide au-
thority for imposing monitoring duties on firms and their partners. The obvious ex-
ample is securities law. See, e.g, In re Keating, Muething & Klekamp, [1979 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,124, at 81,989 (July 2, 1979) (applying SEC
Rules of Practice to require firms to adopt procedures ensuring information relevant
to a securities filing is made available to the attorney responsible for the filing).
78. Rule 5.1(a) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct requires partners to
"make reasonable efforts to ensure that [their] firm has in effect measures giving rea-
sonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm conform to the rules of professional
conduct." Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 5.1(a) (1997). This standard,
however, has not been used as authority for requiring internal controls. See Schneyer,
supra note 58, at 250 ("[Njone of the many jurisdictions with Rule 5.1(a) in effect ever
enforce the duty to maintain internal controls against lawyers in firms with more than
two or three partners-the very firms in which internal controls seem most crucial.");
see also id. at 253 ("The trouble is that Rule 5.1 was also born into a world in which
only individual lawyers are subject to discipline, and never vicariously, even when
they work in group-practice settings.").
79. In 1996, New York's Disciplinary Rules of the Code of Professional Responsi-
bility were amended to require law firms to "adequately supervise, as appropriate, the
work of partners, associates and nonlawyers who work at the firm." N.Y. Comp.
Codes. R. & Regs. tit 22, § 1200.5 (1996). In recommending the amendment, a report
by the Association of the Bar of the City of New York stated that imposing such
duties on firms would improve the practice environment, promote self-government,
enable the supervision of non-lawyers, overcome the difficulty of assigning blame to
individual lawyers, provide disincentives to lawyers who encourage violations by
other lawyers, and address organizational problems. See Henry J. Reske, Promoting
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responsibility standards enforced through bar authorities will fill any
void created by the contraction of the civil liability threat that may
have existed under partnership law.
VII. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
In these few pages, I have suggested some of the ways in which
partnership law has affected the legal profession and the ways that
lawyers provide services to their clients. Partnership law, of course, is
not static, and it remains to be seen how two significant recent statu-
tory changes will affect partnership practices. The first of the
changes-the advent of the limited liability company -has been the
subject of much fanfare and commentary that may overstate its actual
importance to the profession and clients. The second of the changes-
the elimination of the long-standing no-compensation rule for post-
withdrawal services 8 1-has received scant attention but potentially
provides a significant incentive for intensified competition between
law firms and their partners for the loyalty of clients.
Just as partnership law is not static, the partnership form of associa-
tion is undergoing constant change. Sadly, partnership law today re-
mains largely premised on a unitary, classic model of the
partnership-that is to say, partnerships are collegial and egalitarian
associations of partners as co-equals, with each partner actively partic-
ipating in the management of the firm and sharing in its profits and
losses. This premise cannot be further from the reality of modem law
partnerships. Non-equity partners, non-voting partners, contract at-
torneys, part-time partners, of-counsel, branch offices as quasi-in-
dependent units within partnerships, mass layoffs of partners, and
limited income sharing (not so elegantly described on the street as
"you eat what you kill") are among the concepts and activities increas-
ingly prevalent but difficult to reconcile with the classic model of the
partnership premised on the equality of partners.' The simplicity of
the structure suggested by law is defied by the complexity and diver-
sity of modern law partnerships, which may suggest partnership law is
losing its relevance to lawyers associated under the label
"partnership."
Better Supervision: N.Y. Bar Committee Recommends Ethics Rule Changes to Permit
Law-Firm Sanctions, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1993, at 32. New Jersey also imposes duties di-
rectly upon law firms. See New Jersey Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 5.1(a)
(1998) ("Every law firm and organization authorized by the Court Rules to practice
law in this jurisdiction shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that member lawyer or
lawyers otherwise participating in the organization's work undertake measures giving
reasonable assurance that all lawyers conform to the Rules of Professional
Conduct.").
80. See supra notes 60-72 and accompanying text.
81. See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
82. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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My comments have focused on the impact of partnership law on the
legal profession. That the coin has two sides is an appropriate way to
conclude this commentary. In the last decade, a disproportionate
amount of partnership case law has involved disputes among lawyers
who were once partners.83 Litigation among former partners has
sparked the development and refinement of partnership law, particu-
larly in such important areas as fiduciary duties and competition with
the firm, expulsions, and post-withdrawal obligations of firms and
their former partners. Just as partnership law has affected law prac-
tice, the legal profession is shaping partnership law.
83. See, e.g., Ehrlich v. Howe, No. 92 Civ. 1079, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1489
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 1995) (involving expulsions); Vowell & Meelheim, P.C. v. Beddow,
Erben & Bowen, P.A., 679 So. 2d 637 (Ala. 1996) (involving compensation for wind-
ing-up activities); Heller v. Pillsbury Madison & Sutro, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 336 (Ct. App.
1996) (involving expulsions); Grossman v. Davis, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 355 (Ct. App. 1994)
(involving unfinished business and income sharing); Rothman v. Dolin, 24 Cal. Rptr.
2d 571 (Ct. App. 1993) (same); Beckman v. Farmer, 579 A.2d 618 (D.C. 1990) (involv-
ing the existence of partnership and dissolutions); Beasley v. Cadwalader, Wicker-
sham & Taft, No. CI-94-8646, 1996 WL 438777 (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 23, 1996)(involving
expulsions and fiduciary duties), affd in part and rev'd in part, Nos. 96-3818, 97-2805,
97-0146, 97-380, 1998 WL 405919 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. July 28, 1998); Dowd & Dowd v.
Gleason, 693 N.E.2d 358 (Ill. 1998) (involving fiduciary duties); Winston & Strawn v.
Nosal, 664 N.E.2d 239 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (involving expulsions); Flynn v. Cohn, 607
N.E.2d 1236 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (involving dissolutions); Lawlis v. Kightlinger &
Gray, 562 N.E.2d 435 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (involving expulsions); Anderson v. As-
pelmeier, Fisch, Power, Warner & Engberg, 461 N.W.2d 598 (Iowa 1990) (involving
dissolutions); Starr v. Fordham, 648 N.E.2d 1261 (Mass. 1995) (involving profit alloca-
tions and fiduciary duties); Meehan v. Shaughnessy, 535 N.E.2d 1255 (Mass. 1989)
(involving fiduciary duties); Schrempp & Salerno v. Gross, 529 N.W.2d 764 (Neb.
1995) (involving dissolutions); Dawson v. White & Case, 672 N.E.2d 589 (N.Y. 1996)
(involving existence of partnership goodwill, expulsions, and dissolutions); Graubard
Mollen Dannett & Horowitz v. Moskovitz, 653 N.E.2d 1179 (N.Y. 1995) (involving
fiduciary duties); Bohatch v. Butler & Binion, 41 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 308 (1998) (involving
expulsions).
[Vol. 67
